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Abstract
Background: The Government of Romania commissioned international technical assistance to help unpacking the 
causes of arrears in selected public hospitals. Emphases were placed on the governance-related determinants of the 
hospital performance in the context of the Romanian health system. 
Methods: The assessment was structured around a public hospital governance framework examining 4 dimensions: 
institutional arrangements, financing arrangements, accountability arrangements and correspondence between 
responsibility and decision-making capacity. The framework was operationalized using a 2-pronged approach: (i) a policy 
review of broader health system governance arrangements influencing hospital performance; and (ii) a series of 10 case-
studies of public hospitals experiencing financial hardship. Data were collected during 2016-2017 through key informant 
interviews with central authorities and hospital management teams, exhaustive semi-structured questionnaires filled in 
by hospitals, as well as the review of documentary sources where feasible.
Results: Overall, the governance landscape of Romanian public hospitals includes a large number of seemingly modern 
legislative provisions and management instruments. Over the past 30 years substantial efforts have been made to put in 
place standardised hospital classification, hospital governance structures, management and service purchasing contracts 
with key performance indicators, modern reimbursement mechanisms based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), and 
regulatory requirements for accountability, including internal and external audit. Nevertheless, their application appears 
to have been challenging for a range of reasons, pointing to the misalignment between the responsibility and decision-
making capacity given to hospitals in a questionably conducive context. Incoherent policy design, outdated and often 
disjointed regulatory frameworks, and cumbersome administrative procedures limit managerial autonomy and obstruct 
efficiency gains. In a context of chronic insufficient funding, misaligned incentives, and overly rigid service procurement 
processes, hospitals seem to struggle to adjust service baskets to the population’s health needs or to overcoming financial 
hardship. External challenges, combined with the limited strategic, operational, and financial management capacity 
within hospitals, make it difficult to exhibit good financial and general performance.
Conclusion: Existing governance arrangements for Romanian public hospitals appear conducive to poor financial 
performance. The suggested framework for hospital governance assessment has proved a powerful tool for identifying 
system and hospital-specific challenges contributing to sub-optimal hospital performance.
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Background
Hospitals consume a substantial share of health resources 
worldwide: in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member states, hospital expenditure 
represents between 26% and 53% of current health 
expenditure1 or between 1.5% and 5.7% of the national 
gross domestic product.2 The share of hospital expenditure 
from total health expenditure is comparable in developing 
countries – for example, 40% in Kenya,3 29% in Tanzania,4 
36.5% in the Philippines,5 and 35% in India.6 At the same 
time, some international literature reports widespread 
overutilisation of hospital services as well as of wasteful use of 
hospital resources.7 Despite a relative focus on primary care in 
global health, hospitals maintain a central role, as attested, for 
instance, by the inclusion of access to “basic hospital services” 
in the service coverage monitoring framework for universal 
health coverage (UHC).8 As such, creating institutional 
capability for good hospital performance is an important 
issue, towards which governance arrangements play a vital 
role. 
In Romania, public hospitals concentrate the majority of 
hospital infrastructure in terms of number of facilities (64%, 
n = 367 of 576 total hospitals) and of beds (94%, n = 131 337 
beds of 140 339 total).9 Most public hospitals (80%) are run 
by local councils, with the remainder run by the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) or other ministries (eg, the Ministry of 
Transport, the Ministry of National Defence) or governmental 
institutions (eg, the Penitentiary Administration, the 
Romanian Academy). Hospital-related governance and 
financing policy changes occurred during the past decade, 
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Implications for policy makers
• Existing governance arrangements for public hospitals in Romania are linked to poor financial performance. On the revenue side, hospitals 
are funded through rather contradictory arrangements and in practice the majority of hospital funding is determined by historical allocations 
and year-on-year funding availability. On the expenditure side, there are no mechanisms to regulate or respond to the demand for services. In 
addition, managerial autonomy is limited by contradictory legislative provisions.
• From a historical perspective, poor strategic planning and unclear business models have caused misalignment between hospital capacity and 
health needs, and between baskets of services and category of facilities.
• Much needed reform of Romania’s hospital sector would entail: revisiting hospital classification and standards; revising hospital governance 
structures and oversight mechanisms; reconsidering the business models and models of care within hospitals (based on the population’s health 
needs); emphasising continuous capacity building with focus on advanced managerial competences; and improving hospital financing and 
service purchasing arrangements. 
Implications for the public
Hospitals represent a significant proportion of health spending in many countries but the determinants of their performance (and lack thereof) are 
often complex and difficult to discern in practice. We present lessons drawn from a comprehensive governance assessment of 10 public hospitals 
in Romania, which include document review, key informant interviews and in-depth data collection using a standardised questionnaire. Such an 
assessment proves a powerful tool for identifying system and hospital-specific challenges contributing to poor performance, and calls for policy 
interventions towards improved hospital service organisation and delivery with increased patient involvement.
Key Messages 
including: nearly 10% (~15 000) bed reduction of the oversized 
hospital infrastructure inherited from the communist period 
since 2005; a gradual reduction in hospital expenditure from 
51% of the total public health expenses in 2005 to 37% in 
2014 in the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)10; the 
transfer of hospital management from the MoH to local 
authorities; and the introduction of hospital accreditation 
and performance management agreements.11 Nevertheless, 
insufficient funding, suboptimal governance and inefficient 
use of resources persist in the Romanian hospital sector and 
health sector at large.12,13 Public hospitals’ accumulation of 
arrears – defined in the legislation as outstanding payments 
overdue by more than 90 calendar days – has long been an 
issue of concern both for the Government of Romania and its 
partners, including the European Commission and the World 
Bank.14
In 2015 the Government of Romania engaged international 
technical assistance to support the MoH in exploring the 
question “Why do Romanian public hospitals accumulate 
arrears?” Drawing insights from this work, we report here 
on an assessment of the governance arrangements of public 
hospitals with the underlying expectation that such an 
analysis would suggest key policy, technical and managerial 
interventions to improve public hospitals’ financial and 
overall performance. 
Methods
We structured our assessment using a public hospital 
governance framework with 4 dimensions15: institutional 
arrangements, financing arrangements, accountability 
arrangements and correspondence between responsibility 
and decision-making capacity (Table 1). Methodologically, 
the governance framework was operationalised using a 
2-pronged approach: (i) a policy review of broader health 
system elements influencing hospital governance; and (ii) a 
series of 10 case-studies of public hospitals.
The policy review included key informant interviews, 
amongst them hospital managers, finance, accounting, human 
resources (HR), medical and Monitoring and Evaluation 
(M&E) directors, as well as MoH executives, representatives 
from the NHIF, National Authority for Quality Management 
in Healthcare (NAQMH), etc (list of interviewees in 
Supplementary file 1); and a document review of key health 
sector policies, regulations and norms defining hospital 
sector strategies, configuration, governance arrangements, 
financing and budgeting, service purchasing modalities, 
contracting mechanisms, monitoring and reporting, external 
audit, staffing, and quality assurance. For the case-studies, a 
purposive sample of 10 hospitals (of the existing 367 public 
hospitals in Romania) was selected based on pre-specified 
criteria agreed with the MoH: hospital classification as per the 
current legislation; geographic location (region, urban/rural); 
managing entity (MoH or local authorities); and history and 
magnitude of arrears. The objective of the sampling was to 
obtain as representative a sample as possible under all criteria, 
ie, a mix of managing entity, complexity and generalist-
specialist hospitals, from at least 3 regions of Romania, with 
currently substantive arrears.
The activity of the sampled hospitals was documented 
using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. We 
developed a standardised data collection instrument based 
on the OECD healthcare quality indicators16 and on previous 
hospital performance measurements.17,18 The questionnaire 
comprised 150 questions structured in 5 blocks: (1) Hospital 
ownership, structure, and internal governance arrangements; 
(2) Hospital inputs (eg, physical assets, infrastructure, 
equipment and staff); (3) Hospital activity/processes 
(eg, population coverage, basket of services, clinical and 
managerial activity); (4) Hospital management, with a focus 
on financial management (costs and revenues, contracts, 
service purchasing mechanisms, outscoring, accounting, 
internal audit); and (5) Hospital outputs and outcomes (eg, 
quality of care, safety, patient satisfaction, efficiency and 
effectiveness). Additionally, a financial audit questionnaire 
was developed and applied by professional auditors compliant 
with ISAE 3000 standards.19 The Supplementary file 2 shows 
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how questionnaire sub-sections map to each of the 4 domains 
of the governance framework in Table 1.
Data collection took place between September 2016 and 
March 2017 and entailed conducting semi-structured key 
informant interviews with hospital management teams 
and representatives of central authorities, and collecting 
hospital data using the standardised questionnaires through 
repeated site visits and face-to-face interviews with hospital 
management teams. The base year for hospital activity 
and financial data was 2015, with historical data for trends 
collected for the interval 2010-2015. The characteristics of the 
10 sampled hospitals in relation to the selection criteria are 
summarised in Table 2 – obscuring for professional reasons 
the names of the hospitals.
Results
In what follows, we present the findings of the assessment for 
the hospital governance framework’s 4 dimensions. For each 
dimension, we first outline the relevant regulatory framework 
and continue with findings from the case studies.
Institutional Arrangements
Law 95/2006 (Title VII “Hospitals”) specifies the principles 
of classification, organisation and management of public 
hospitals. A number of formal hospital classifications are 
in place, based on ownership (public; public with private 
wards; and private), geography (regional; county; and local 
– municipal, city, or village), pathology (general; emergency; 
specialty; and chronic disease), medical research status 
(clinical hospitals and institutes) and clinical competencies 
(from category I, the most complex, to category IV, the 
least complex; category V includes specialist long-term care 
hospitals, such as mental health facilities).
The public hospital’s managing entity can be a legal 
or a physical person (“the manager”) entering a 3-year 
management contract (extended to 4 years in 2018) with the 
MoH or the local authority. The executive management of 
the hospital is ensured by a managerial board comprising the 
manager, the medical director, the financial director and, if the 
hospital has more than 400 beds, a care manager (ie, a nurse). 
The members of the managerial board are selected through 
Table 1. Governance Framework for Public Hospitals
Dimension Key Questions
Institutional
Who are you? 
What are your credentials? 
To what are you entitled? 
Are you recognized as “different and special,” or not?
Financing
What freedom do you have to handle your resources? 
From where do you get your money? 
How do you cope with your capital and revenue needs? 
What is your process for managing investments and running costs?
Accountability
On behalf of whom are you acting? 
To whom do you report? 
What kind of organisational structure do you have in that context? Who is involved in your decision-making processes?
Correspondence between 
responsibility and decision-
making capacity
Can you honour your promises? 
Are you able to negotiate and reach agreements with others? 
How do you adjust to contingencies? 
How transparent are your day-to-day operations?
Table 2. Characteristics of Hospitals Included in the Study
Hospital Geography (Development Region) Ownership Hospital Profile
Service Complexity 
Category (I–V)
Last Recorded 
Arrears
Magnitude of Last 
Recorded Arrearsa
H1 North-East Local authorities Town IV November 2014 10.9%
H2 Bucharest MoH Emergency I conformation plan August 2016 <0.5%
H3 Bucharest Local authorities City mono-specialty II M December 2014 <0.5%
H4 West Local authorities Municipal IV August 2016 4.3%
H5 Bucharest MoH Institute I M July 2015 0.5%
H6 Bucharest MoH Emergency II conformation plan November 2013 n/a
H7 South Local authorities County III July 2016 <0.5%
H8 South Local authorities Municipal IV August 2016 33.2%
H9 South-West Local authorities County III May 2016 0.9%
H10 West Local authorities City mono-specialty II M August 2016 8.7%
Abbreviation: MoH, Ministry of Health.
a Calculated as a percentage of last recorded arrears relative to the period expenditure in the respective calendar year. For example, if a hospital last recorded 
arrears in October 2015, magnitude is calculated as % of arrears (October 2015) relative to the hospital’s budget execution January-October 2015.
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contest and sign a 3-year performance agreement with the 
hospital manager, which includes performance indicators. 
Other internal structures mandated by Law 95/2006 are 
the medical council (with attributions towards monitoring 
and improving hospitals’ clinical activity performance), the 
ethical council (Art. 186, with specific attributions detailed 
in MO 145/2015), and the administration council (Art. 187). 
The administration council ensures the hospital strategic 
management, including but not limited to approving the 
budget and procurement plans and analysing the activity of 
the managerial board. Its exact composition is stipulated by 
Law, comprising 5 to 8 members, including representatives 
of the MoH or District Public Health Authorities (DPHA), 
representatives of the district or local council, a representative 
of the Mayor, representatives of the professional associations 
(Physicians’ Council and Nurses’ Council, both with ‘guest’ 
status) and, for teaching hospitals, a representative of the 
medical university. Separate legislation mandates the setup 
and functioning of other committees, such as the quality 
assurance committee and the haemovigilance and blood safety 
committee. Most committees have a consultative role and 
report to the management board; only the ethics committee 
is formally placed outside the hospital’s clinical governance 
arrangements and has broader decision-making powers, eg, 
it can independently alert the relevant public authorities in 
cases of reported bribery or misconduct. 
All 10 hospitals in our study were able to produce a list 
of functioning committees and their respective operating 
procedures. However, there was considerable variation in the 
number of committees, from as little as 3, to as many as 45 
(Table 3), and their membership (from one member to as high 
a number as 46), as well as the functions of the committees 
themselves. For example, some hospitals did not report 
having set up some committees mandated by law, while others 
reported setting up committees reflecting their specific needs, 
such as “the committee for declaring brain death” in H7; the 
“social dialogue committee” emphasising the relationship 
with the community (in H2 and H7), or with professional 
associations (H9). Several internal structures, including 
those with clinical remit, were dysfunctional at the time of 
the assessment – for example, the quality committee in H2, 
the infection control committee in H8 and the pharmacy 
inventory committee in H9 had no appointees. 
Widespread distrust was noted among the hospital 
management teams towards the need for strategic leadership 
or governance arrangements. Hospital boards and committees 
were seen as cumbersome structures that obstruct decision 
making, as opposed to bringing added value. At least 2 
managers admitted that “people who are less busy are appointed 
on the committees.” For example, H10: 
“The Board of Directors is strictly a formal committee. 
We get together and discuss things that we also discuss in 
the Medical Council. The Board of Directors approves all 
proposals, it is extremely open. While it does not impede the 
hospital’s activity, it does not facilitate it, either.” 
Regardless of typology and the official classification, all 
assessed hospitals face infrastructure-related challenges. The 
main buildings of sampled hospitals are dated from before 
the 1980s and are often scattered across multiple locations; 
6 hospitals in the sample had buildings on more than one 
site (Table 4). There was little indication that procurement 
of medical equipment was informed by a situation analysis 
or business case which took into account the medical need 
among the target population, or the hospital’s own patient 
case-mix (ie, the measure of diversity, complexity and resource 
intensity of admitted cases). For example, a low complexity 
general hospital (level IV) in a small municipality possesses a 
computer tomography (CT) scanner. 
Likewise, diluted correspondence was observed between the 
basket of services rendered and the typology of hospitals. For 
example, the same Level IV general hospital provides cancer 
therapy alongside balneology services. Table 4 visualises 
unstructured patterns of defining and maintaining the 
infrastructure, equipment, and HR, with a little conjunction 
with the hospital profiles and the complexity of services. 
Two of the assessed hospitals have a distinguished image 
in public, being considered the “reliable place to go” during 
medical emergencies. The search to understand the “success 
factors” resulted in emphases on the strong strategic 
leadership, stronger financial management and M&E systems 
and processes, top historical image, and the ability to attract 
the best medical cadre (largely due to a central location and 
existing image). 
Financial Arrangements 
Law 95/2006 stipulates that public hospitals have “financial 
autonomy,” understood as the capacity to “a) organize their 
activity based on the revenue and expenditure budget, approved 
by the management board and the respective credit release 
authority; and b) elaborate the budget based on evaluating 
revenues and expenditures informed by the proposals received 
from hospital wards and compartments” (Art. 190). Different 
pieces of legislation govern the preparation and execution of 
budgets for hospitals administered by local authorities (Law 
273/2006 on local finances) and by the MoH (MO 1043/2010 
on budgeting for public hospitals). However, all public 
hospitals can receive funding from a wide range of sources: 
hospitals administered by the MoH can receive funding 
from state, county and local budgets as well as from the 
MoH, while hospitals administered by local authorities can 
receive funding from local budgets as well as from the state 
Table 3. Internal Committees Reported by the Sampled Hospitals
Hospital No. of Internal Committees (of Which, Clinical Committees)
H1 12 (6)
H2 11 (4)
H3 9 (4)
H4 3 (1)
H5 12 (5)
H6 12 (7)
H7 17 (9)
H8 5 (3)
H9 45 (10)
H10 18 (10)
Duran et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(4), 199–210 203
Table 4. Selected Infrastructure and Equipment Availability in the Sampled Hospitals (2015 Data)
Hospital Complexity
Infrastructure Equipment HR
Year Main Building Built No. of Sites
No. of Buildings 
(Units) # Beds
No. of 
OT (OR) X-Ray CT MRI Laparoscopic Radiotherapy
Total Actual 
Staff
Doctors Nurses Vacancies
H1 IV 1977 4 4 193 1 Yes Yes No Yes No 244 36 89 33
H2 I 1967 1 6 725 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2434 267a 848 420
H3 IIM 1894 1 5 119 3 Yes Yes No Yes No 195 11 88 71
H4 IV 1911 2 10 368 1 (4) Yes No No Yes No 363 52 174 105
H5 IM 1906 5 13 632 3 Yes No No No No 711 90 270 98
H6 II 1972 1 4 525 17 Yes Yes Nob No 1776 166 425 314
H7 III 1974 5 7 1160 3 Yes Yes No Yes No 2164 168 942 337
H8 IV 1987 2 7 298 3 Yes No No Yes 338 37 151 102
H9 III 1970 3 8 1153 1 (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes No 1699 236 845 837
H10 IIM 1932; 1973c 1 11 325 1 Yes No No No 389.5 43 114 14
Abbreviations: HR, human resources; OT, operating theatre; OR, operating room; CT, computed tomography; MRI, Magnetic resonance imaging.
a Additionally, there are more than 800 residents.
b Outsourced to a local private provider.
c The hospital has 2 main pavilions.
Duran et al
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and MoH budget for medical equipment (with a contribution 
from local authorities of at least 10% of the project value), 
for major refurbishment (minimum 5% contribution), and 
modernisations/extensions (minimum 10% contribution). 
In principle, revenues from the NHIF should cover the 
hospitals’ operating expenses with MoH funding only 
supporting capital investments. However, at the time of this 
assessment there were no formal criteria in place for allocating 
MoH funds, and substantial variations were observed in terms 
of the relative shares received from these sources (Table 5). 
Contracts with the NHIH represent the majority of funding, 
ranging from 41% to 86% of total revenues. The 3 MoH-
administered hospitals received between 18% and 38% of 
revenue as subventions from the state budget, while hospitals 
administered by the LA did not receive any budget transfers. 
In practice, funding arrangements was found to be more 
complex and opportunistic. For example, in one hospital 
(H9) the county council provided funding for food coupons, 
while the regional forensics institute covered the salaries of 
personnel involved in the hospital’s forensics service.
Year-on-year fluctuations in the hospitals’ net debt-surplus 
has been seen to rise up to (+/-) 20%-40% of their annual 
revenues (Table 6). One Level IV municipal hospital (H8) 
received cash inflow outside the normal course of operations 
from the municipality in order to cover outstanding liabilities 
– without it, the hospital would probably have incurred 
additional arrears. By contrast, a level II emergency hospital 
(H6) requests funds from the MoH one month in advance – 
should the MoH delay payments, this hospital would most 
probably incur arrears.
The main mechanisms of hospital funding comprise a 
mix of case-based payments from the NHIH, and lump sum 
payments for curative national health programmes (NHPs) 
from the MoH. Expenditure with NHPs was relatively 
constant between 2013 and 2016 at about RON 3 billion per 
annum (12%-14% of NHIF), while diagnosis-related group 
(DRG)-based reimbursements amount to RON 8-10 billion 
per annum.10 The Framework Contract with the NHIH is the 
main legislative tool regulating health service purchasing, 
issued every 2 years as a joint order signed by the Minister 
of Health and the NHIH President. The contract specifies in 
detail the benefits package (by service delivery level), provider 
payment mechanism, quality criteria, rights and obligations of 
the payer, providers and the insured etc. It also stipulates the 
formula for the total contracted sum (CS) for acute inpatient 
cases in DRG hospitals (equation 1), as well as the average 
length of stay (ALOS), Case Mix Index (CMI), standard bed 
utilisation rate and tariff for each hospital, based on historical 
activity in the previous year (eg, 2015 data informing the 
Framework Contract 2016-2017).
CS = P X (number of contractible beds X bed utilisation rate/
hospital average ALOS) X hospital Case Mix Index X tariff per 
adjusted case (equation 1),
where P is an adjustment factor 62%-85% which depends 
on the hospital’s classification I-V. 
While DRGs require up-to-date information on the average 
costs per type of case, the current DRG cost weights in 
Romania do not match the reality of hospital service costs, 
as long known and further confirmed by a 2012 review.20 
The relative weights in current use are mainly drawn from 
the Australian weight structure, which was slightly altered in 
2010 to include new definitions of cases and co-morbidities 
(but not significantly changed at its core). Moreover, the 
number of “contractible beds” for each hospital is decided 
annually by the respective county health insurance house 
based on the available funding (ie, county-level allocation 
from NHIF), and is usually lower than the total number of 
beds in the hospital structure.
All hospitals acknowledged that the contracting process 
with the county health insurance houses leaves almost no 
space for contract negotiations on price, service volumes and 
quality. Furthermore, county insurance houses apply invoice 
cut-offs, disregarding services actually delivered by hospitals 
in reporting periods when they exceed the agreed contract 
volume/value, expecting the hospital to cover the costs from 
other sources.
 “There is no actual negotiation with the [county] health 
insurance house. Money is divided based on the number of 
beds and per each medical unit. The amount established 
by the health insurance house is divided in quarters in the 
Table 5. Revenue Sources for the Sampled Hospitals, as a Proportion of Total Revenues (%)
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
Administered by LA MoH LA LA MoH MoH LA LA LA LA
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Property 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Goods and services, of which 89% 43% 45% 87% 69% 56% 86% 91% 91% 99%
Contracts with health insurance houses 83% 42% 41% 82% 67% 56% 67% 86% 73% 56%
Capital and other financial operations 0% 0% 0% 4% 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0%
Subventions, of which 11% 57% 55% 9% 29% 43% 12% 9% 7% 1%
Direct from state budget 0% 29% 0% 0% 18% 38% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Direct from other administrations (including local 
councils)
11% 12% 55% 7% 3% 5% 11% 9% 7% 1%
From state budget via local councils, for investment 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0%
From MoH via local authorities, for investment 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Abbreviations: LA, local authority; MoH, Ministry of Health.
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contract concluded with the hospital” [H9].
 “There is no real negotiation between the hospital and the 
Health Insurance House” [H3].
All hospitals also reported that the keeping of dozens of 
segmented programmes by the MoH is cumbersome from an 
administrative perspective (eg, each programme reimburses 
specific inputs) and represents a source of arguable decisions. 
Subsidies from local authorities are mandated by law, but 
in practice their quantum and frequency depend on the 
wealth of the concerned authority and introduce direct 
political influence in resource availability. Several hospitals 
commended the financial support of local authorities (eg, 
H9), while others (eg, H4 and H10) reported the need for 
more involvement in supporting the operating expenses of 
the hospital. In one case (H10), this would not be possible in 
the foreseeable future because “the local council believes this 
will create a precedent for the other 2 hospitals it administers.” 
The majority of assessed hospitals questioned the need for 
a complete budget cycle of resource allocation, admitting 
that financial planning and budgeting are largely reduced to 
a simplified administration of revenues and expenditures. 
This was justified by acknowledging that “nothing changes 
over the years, therefore there is no need to plan.” Even the 
recommendations of negative financial audit reports lead to 
minimal changes. Two of the sampled hospital management 
teams admitted to deliberately incurring arrears as “a means 
to attract attention of the Government or donors, and thus, 
additional funding.” The financial audit identified instances 
where hospital management does not follow legislation and/
or internal procedures concerning public acquisition, setting 
payroll-related taxes and addressing arrears. 
Accountability Arrangements
Performance Management
Hospital managers sign a contract with the managing entity 
(MoH or the local authority), which includes an annual 
performance assessment within the framework of 28 
indicators grouped under 4 categories: HR (6 indicators), 
service utilisation (10 indicators), financial management (6 
indicators), and quality of care (6 indicators). National average 
values for most of these performance indicators computed 
by the National School of Public Health and Management 
in 2007 (MO 1567/2007), by type of hospital, were used to 
Table 6. Annual Debt/Surplus for the Sampled Hospitals, as a Proportion 
of Total Revenues (%)
Hospital 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
H1 3.2% 0.9% -0.2% 0.0% 2.5%
H2 -7.4% -2.1% 4.5% 18.2% 25.0%
H3 5.5% -12.2% -31.1% 28.7% 45.6%
H4 4.7% 1.8% -8.5% -6.0% -2.4%
H5 -0.8% 9.5% -11.8% 7.2% 11.2%
H6 -8.1% -2.1% -4.6% -5.2% -3.8%
H7 -4.5% -4.4% -1.0% 6.3% -3.1%
H8 -28.1% -9.9% -12.5% 49.2% -88.9%
H9 14.1% 0.5% 1.6% 7.2% -1.7%
H10 7.6% -9.9% -3.6% 6.6% -5.4%
set performance benchmarks. These average values have 
not been updated since and, in practice, have been mildly 
adjusted year-on-year, at the discretion of each oversight 
entity and so as to align with the actual hospital activity. 
According to the contract, the manager can be demoted if the 
performance indicators in the contract are not achieved for at 
least one year, and if that is the manager’s fault. In the initial 
hospital management contract (MO 1384/2010), the contract 
would cease (ie, the hospital manager would be automatically 
dismissed) due to incurring outstanding payments older than 
2 years. In 2015, this interval was shortened to 3 months (MO 
768/2015). For hospitals managed by the local authority, the 
hospital’s management board proposes the revocation of the 
manager.
The managers reported the absence of de facto support 
mechanisms when deviations from the target indicators arise, 
leading to inaccurate or, at best, mechanical reporting against 
the performance indicators towards matching the target 
values in the contract. For example:
“Performance indicators are much too general and that 
they should be customised/adapted per hospital type” [H10]. 
 “Performance indicators in hospital manager’s contract 
are NOT negotiated” [H1].
 “Some of the indicators are relevant, some others not/
some of them are or not under control – many of them are on 
medical activity and not on administrative activity as credit 
accountant” [H7].
Information Management
MO 1571/2010 is the legislative foundation for a suite of 
medical services’ e-monitoring systems currently combined 
under the umbrella concept Health Insurance IT Platform 
(Platforma Informatica a Asigurarilor de Sanatate, PIAS). 
This comprises several systems, all administered by the 
NHIH. Relevant for hospitals are SIUI (Unique Integrated 
IT System), which records the detailed activity of health 
service providers for NHIF reimbursement purposes; CEAS 
(Electronic Health Insurance Card System), which monitors 
the use of health services by patients authenticated on the basis 
of the individual Health Insurance Card; and DES (Electronic 
Health Record), which records patients’ details and their 
full medical history. Additionally, all public hospitals report 
monthly to MoH on their financial activity, including debts 
and arrears. Data are analysed regularly by the MoH’s Integrity 
Department and monthly/quarterly reports are compiled. 
The MoH’s Audit Department also conducts regular audits in 
hospitals managed by the MoH. Cumulatively, these systems 
collect a large amount of information, yet there are no formal 
policy mechanisms to act upon their findings and the extent 
to which this information is used for policy decisions remains 
unknown.
Interviews with hospital managers and the analysis of 
activity data provided by the hospitals identified a range of 
data-related weaknesses, including: inconsistent reporting 
formats of in-patient activity across hospitals (eg, some report 
parallel sets of statistics for insured and uninsured patients, the 
same indicators reported either as rates or absolute number of 
cases from one hospital to another), arguable reliability and 
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consistency regarding staff behaviour (especially patients’ 
complaints) and incomplete/inconsistent data collection for 
outcomes. Hospital managers acknowledged the weakness 
of M&E processes and practices, referring to fragmented 
monitoring, duplicate reporting to various stakeholders, lack 
of analytical capabilities and no formal incorporation of past 
lessons in future planning cycles. 
Clinical Management
Quality of care is regulated in Romania at several levels, with 
the MoH, the NHIH and the National Authority for Quality 
Management in Healthcare (NAQMH) as key institutions. At 
highest level, Law 95/2006 stipulates that the MoH elaborates 
and implements measures for improving the efficiency and 
quality of health services (Art. 169, 1) and that the NHIH 
is responsible for ensuring the quality of health services 
comprised in the essential benefit package, based on criteria 
elaborated jointly with the MoH (Art. 238-239). Each hospital 
is mandated to elaborate/put in place its own clinical protocols, 
taking into account its specific context (eg, availability of 
equipment and staff). Quality management structures have 
been set up in hospitals (MO 975/2012), where the mandate 
includes implementing and monitoring the results of quality 
assurance mechanisms and training hospital staff in quality 
assurance. The second version of the NAQMH-elaborated 
hospital accreditation standards (MO 446/2017) entails 
reviewing the activity of each facility’s quality management 
structure in overseeing the existence, content and appropriate 
use of these protocols. There is no routine mechanism for 
monitoring the daily implementation of guidelines or the 
locally adapted protocols. 
Interviews revealed the under-utilisation of quality 
assurance committees in improving clinical performance. 
Statistical information related to clinical outcomes was sparse 
– for example, few hospitals record systematic data on 30-day 
standardised mortality after admission for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) and ischaemic stroke, or the percentage of 
high risk transient ischaemic attack (TIA) patients treated 
within 24 hours of occurrence (Table 7). Moreover, many 
outcome indicator values appear either unrealistic (eg, 0 
nosocomial infections) or display considerable year-on-
year variation (eg, from 11.5% to 30.5% age-gender 30-day 
standardised mortality rate after admission for AMI). Despite 
all hospitals having at least some surgical activity (Table 
8), most hospitals reported that causes of post-operative 
mortality are not regularly monitored, or could provide only 
an indicative list of causes unsupported by records. One 
hospital (H8) justified this situation: “The hospital does not 
have post-operative mortality, because the surgeries performed 
are quite simple.”
Decision-Making Capacity Versus Responsibility
One of the most remarkable findings of the study is that while 
legislative provisions confer autonomy to hospital managers 
over a wide range of managerial decisions, including financial 
management, HR and hospital structure, hospital managers 
systematically reported having “almost zero managerial 
autonomy.” Managers acknowledged limited authority to 
change their hospital’s organisational structure (eg, structure 
of wards, number of beds and staff) without the approval of 
the MoH or the local authority. Changing the ward structure 
could only be obtained through lengthy procedures (taking 
up to 6 months for MoH-administered hospitals) and would 
also bring upon the hospital the obligation to undergo a fresh 
accreditation cycle, with associated costs (thus discouraging 
managers from pursuing such reorganisations). Hiring 
personnel for already approved positions in the organogram 
also requires the MoH or local authority’s approval, etc.
Funding insufficiency was identified by all managers as the 
key challenge to their operations and was partly linked to the 
allocation and utilisation of funds contracted from the county 
health insurance house. For example:
 “With regards to arrears, the amount needed for their 
coverage is approximately equal to the amount not paid 
by the health insurance house (corresponding to medical 
services delivered in excess of the contract threshold). If the 
house reimbursed the medical services delivered and not only 
the services contracted, this hospital would be able to pay 
arrears, or even achieve a surplus” [H10].
“The district health insurance house contracts 
approximately 88% of medical services delivered by the 
hospital, but with significant variations, between 60% - 98%. 
The list of reasons for debt accumulation is supplemented 
by contracting rules and formulas, discriminating measures 
that do not allow the conclusion of contracts that consider 
the true capacity and needs of the hospital. This in turn leads 
to a distorted funding practice that is completely unrelated 
to the real and actual costs of our hospital, of many services, 
pathologies/specialties, and to the obsolete infrastructure 
that generates operational expenditures above average” [H4].
Most hospital managers mentioned their responsibility 
of admitting any patient who would come through the 
hospital’s door, irrespective of insured status. The only reason 
why hospitalisation would be refused would be “cases that 
cannot be treated in our hospital due to equipment shortage 
or inexistent specialty” (H9). A number of hospital managers 
(eg, H6 and H10) invoked the “social mission of the hospital”, 
which usually comes to the fore during winter months, when 
hospital management confronts a sharp increase in “social 
cases.” Most of these are homeless patients who have nowhere 
to go and remain admitted for much longer periods than 
warranted by medical need, if there ever was any. Their volume 
was informally estimated by some managers (eg, H9) at 10% 
of total cases at a given point in time and was linked to the 
absence of social care centres in their localities. This situation, 
in their opinion, strains the hospital’s budget because some 
cases are not emergencies (which are reimbursed separately 
from DRGs) and patients are often uninsured, (therefore 
the inpatient episode cannot be reimbursed from the NHIF 
and hospitals need to cover the associated costs from other 
sources). 
Similarly, a perceived “social” responsibility on maintaining 
hospital jobs seems to have a strong influence on the 
managers’ operational decisions. For example, H9 considered 
the decision to outsource laundry services but eventually 
declined to do so because the external laundry company 
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Table 7. Selected Quality of Care and Safety Indicators in the Sampled Hospitals
Indicator H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
Age-gender 30-day standardised mortality after admission for AMI (%) 11.5-30.5
Age-gender 30-day standardised mortality after admission for AMI (cases) 0-2 4-31
Age-gender 30-day standardised mortality after admission for stroke (%) 0.5-2.8
Age-gender 30-day standardised mortality after admission for stroke (cases) 0 10-28
Emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge (%) 0 3.3-4.0 7.8-9.9 1.2-2.3 7.1-8.1
Emergency readmission within 28 days of discharge (cases) 2041-2867
Inpatient mortality rate 0.2-0.8 3.3-4.3 1.7-2.6 1.5-2 2.5-3.9 2.8-4.1 0.7-1.2
Nosocomial infections (per 100 discharged patients) 0.8-1.0 0.05-0.5 0.1-0.2 0-0.7 0.1-0.3
Nosocomial infections (cases) 0-1 6 22-138
Post-operative sepsis/complications (%) 0 1.8-2 0-0.07 0.15-0.45
Pressure ulcers/bedsores (per 1000 beds) 3-28 78-99 38-66
Unplanned returns to operating theatre (%) 0 1-2 0.7-1
Abbreviation: AMI, acute myocardial infarction.
Notes: blank spaces denote the respective indicators were not reported by the hospitals. Ranges are minimum-maximum annual averages over the 2011-2015 interval.
Table 8. Selected Output Indicators in the Sampled Hospitals (2015 Data)
No. of
Doctors
No. of
Beds
No.
of OTs ALOS (Days)
Average Occupancy 
Rate (%)
Surgical
Interventions
Surgeries
Per OT
Surgeries
Per Doctor
Surgeries
Per Nurse
H1 36 193 3 11.3 90 1.139 380 32 13
H2 1315 725 6 6.4 86 25.254 4.209 19 30
H3 11 119 3 4.3 69 2.509 836 228 29
H4 52 368 4 8.0 60 2.661 665 51 15
H5 90 632 3 14.2 91 3.368 1.123 37 12
H6 166 525 17 6.3 81 10.255 603 62 20
H7 168 1.160 3 7.0 80 25.997 8.666 155 28
H8 37 298 3 5.5 49 1.416 472 38 9
H9 236 1.153 11 7.6 78 1.639 149 7 2
H10 42 315 1 11.0 70 179 179 4.3 1.6
Abbreviations: ALOS, average length of stay; OT, operating theatre.
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would have taken over the entire personnel and jobs would 
have been lost (personnel in the hospital’s food unit were 
requalified for laundry services, at the hospital’s expense, to 
keep laundry function internal). 
There are also issues of organisational and professional 
culture. Legislation stipulates a bottom-up approach to 
budgeting, with chief of departments/wards drafting annual 
budgets and submitting them to the hospital manager for 
consolidation. In cases where the manager does not have a 
clinical background, this exercise can become mechanistic.
 “As an economist, the manager of a hospital does NOT 
have the competencies to correct/challenge the doctors’ 
budget” [H7].
Discussion
Summary of Findings 
The governance arrangements of Romanian hospitals include 
a large number of seemingly modern legislative provisions, 
regulatory frameworks and management instruments, such 
as competency-based hospital classification, reimbursement 
using DRGs, hospital boards, and management performance 
contracts with standardised performance indicators. Their 
application, however, appears problematic for a wide range of 
reasons. There are instances of incoherent policy design and 
misaligned or contradictory incentives – for example, DRG-
based reimbursement is used by the NHIH in the direction of 
gradually reducing the number of hospital beds, but hospital 
staffing norms are linked directly to the number of beds, 
making managers feel pressured to avoid layoffs. In other 
cases, incomplete regulatory frameworks undermine the 
entire purpose of the respective policy – for example, lack of 
updated target values for standardised performance indicators 
makes most performance contracts a formality whereby 
target values and indicator reporting become meaningless. 
Furthermore, the disconnect between DRG tariffs and the real 
cost structure faced by hospitals makes NHIH reimbursement 
an unreliable basis for financial planning because the recovery 
of operational costs is often not even feasible. In addition to 
the financing and service purchasing limitations, formally 
declared managerial autonomy is eroded by the cumbersome 
administrative procedures (eg, changing the organisational 
structure of the hospital). This limits the managers’ decision-
making capability and contributes to perpetuating the status 
quo, ie, maintaining a large number of vacant positions.
The core challenges identified by the assessment in the 
10 sampled hospitals are summarised in Table 9. Some 
challenges were identified in all hospitals, such as insufficient 
funding, limited managerial autonomy and meaningless 
contract negotiations with the insurance house. There was 
little indication of the hospital management’s ability to 
overcome those challenges and despite formal statements to 
the contrary, such elements appear as immutable components 
of the context. 
Other challenges were reported or identified in some of the 
hospitals, but not in all of them – for example, single speciality 
hospitals raised more acutely the issue of overly rigid and 
generic performance indicators, which do not reflect their 
particular case-mix and service delivery structure. In a similar 
vein, some hospitals reported receiving consistent financial 
support from the local authorities, while others reported 
obstacles in engaging local stakeholders to contribute towards 
hospital operations. 
As a consequence, there was substantial variability in the 
sampled hospitals’ material and staff endowment, service 
production and practical implementation of governance 
arrangements. Some, but not all of this variability, can be 
explained by the hospital complexity level – more complex 
hospitals (level I and II) in the sample were generally better 
endowed and had more comprehensive monitoring processes 
and systems. For most hospitals however, the link between 
endowment, service organisation and the medical need, or 
burden of disease in their respective catchment area is unclear.
Analysis of Findings 
Figure  synthesises the hospital governance related challenges 
by the assessment framework pillars. On the revenue side, 
hospitals are funded through complex arrangements that 
involve multiple stakeholders and contracting frameworks. 
There is a distinct focus on top-down cost control: the 
majority of hospital funding comes from the NHIH, which is 
determined in practice by historical allocations and the year-
on-year funding availability. Table 5 highlights the variability 
of revenues from the MoH and the NHIH by hospitals. 
Moreover, the NHIH funding formula includes multiple 
conflicting parameters, eg, number of contractible beds and 
also case-mix index, leaving very little (if any) space to address 
the ever-changing service delivery needs and respective 
estimation of hospital revenues. In fact, it allows the complete 
Table 9. Synthesis of Governance-Related Challenges Identified in Sampled Hospitals
Institutional Arrangements Accountability Arrangements Financing Arrangements
•	 Underappreciation for the role of strategic 
leadership in hospital management
•	 Dysfunctional governance bodies/
committees 
•	 Resource heavy (outdated and spread over) 
infrastructure Un-systematic equipment 
planning and procurement
•	 Rigid performance framework
•	 Uneven, incomplete systems 
and processes for information 
management 
•	 Challenges with clinical 
management 
•	 Insufficient funding
•	 Complex, burdensome funding streams
•	 Rigid DRG-based contracting and reimbursement
•	 Poor financial management, procurement and 
outsourcing
•	 Poor or absent internal auditing and poor 
response to external audit
Correspondence between Responsibility and Decision-Making Capacity
•	 Zero managerial autonomy 
•	 Social mission of the hospital towards the community ~ unnecessarily long stays, keeping jobs
•	 Regulations and governance arrangements forcing to maintain unnecessary and costly infrastructure and vacant posts 
Abbreviation: DRG, diagnosis-related group.
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alternation of the true DRG design and virtually eliminates 
any opportunity for hospital managers to use the DRG-based 
payments for efficiency and effectiveness improvements.
On the expenditure side, there are no transparent 
mechanisms to regulate the demand for services (eg, de facto 
admittance of nearly every case and “social mission”) or to adjust 
funding in response to demand (eg, no real negotiations with 
the insurance house); and managerial autonomy is hampered 
by contradictory legislative provisions (eg, the link between 
beds, revenues and staffing) and cumbersome procedures 
(eg, structural reorganisation). In such an environment, the 
accumulation of arrears in Romanian public hospitals has 
lost much of its meaning as a marker of sub-optimal hospital 
performance.
This study identifies the core challenges of the inability 
to address the substantial inconsistency in the endowment, 
service production and outcomes across the sampled 
hospitals. It is unclear for most facilities how outputs relate to 
the burden of disease; duplications as well as inefficiencies are 
also widespread, with facilities of different levels essentially 
producing much of the same type of services. Most business 
processes are not rigorously designed, are applied rather 
haphazardly and are insufficiently monitored. It is also 
unclear how quality of services can be improved either 
by the hospitals themselves (with current internal quality 
assurance mechanisms) or by inspections, accreditation, and 
comparison with other hospitals. 
The response (or lack thereof) by hospital managers to 
the constraints in organising and running their facilities also 
points to insufficient strategic, operational, and financial 
management capabilities. Inconsistent decision-making 
in hospitals, sub-optimal quality of care and insufficient 
patient-centeredness are much more serious challenges than 
arrears themselves. In this sense, it can be said that existing 
governance arrangements for public hospitals in Romania 
appear conducive to poor financial performance and stimulate 
complex relationships between the policy maker, purchaser 
and service provider.
Discussions with project stakeholders revealed that most 
of the identified challenges have been well-known for years – 
for example, the limitations of the current DRG system have 
long been documented.21 This only reveals the deep nature 
of the issues analysed in this paper. Historically speaking, 
poor strategic planning and unclear business models appear 
to have caused misalignment between hospital capacity and 
health needs, and between baskets of services and category 
of facilities in Romania. Hospital sector policies over many 
years, enacted through conflicting or outdated regulatory 
frameworks, have incentivised hospitals to maintain 
excessive, inefficient infrastructure and weak accountability 
mechanisms. The challenge for going forward is to find a 
consensus-based mechanism to solve those imbalances. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
The main strength of our study derives from using a 
structured and comprehensive governance assessment 
framework, designed for public hospitals and supported by 
ample data collection at central and hospital level. We believe 
our findings offer a broad, in-depth view of how Romanian 
public hospitals really function. 
There are also limitations. While every effort was made to 
include a representative sample of hospitals, the cohort of 10 
hospitals, chosen by the MoH, is hardly representative in a 
statistical sense. Also, the absence of a control group (hospitals 
with no history of arrears) makes it difficult to ascertain 
the specific factors which determine the accumulation of 
arrears and, more broadly, poor hospital performance. Some 
data requested from hospitals on their clinical and financial 
activity could not be provided in time for the analysis – 
the availability of time series for outcome indicators was 
particularly problematic. 
Also, not all governance issues suggested in the Framework/
summarised in Table 1 were covered in the same depths. 
Relationship With Other Studies
To our knowledge, this is the first in-depth, systematic 
assessment of public hospitals in Romania and one of the first 
assessments of governance arrangements for public hospitals 
in Eastern Europe. Previous in-depth service delivery 
assessments in Romania focused on primary care services.22 
Some of our findings are aligned with previous studies – a 
recent analysis identified price reduction as the key criterion 
driving drug policy decisions in Romania.23 
Other studies of factors affecting decision-making processes 
in public hospitals had similar findings. For example, the 
factors that affect priority setting and resource allocation 
decision practices, as identified in a recent case-study of 2 
Kenyan public hospitals, were inadequate financing level and 
poorly designed financing arrangements; limited hospital 
autonomy and decision space; and inadequate management 
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Figure. Influence of Governance Arrangements on Financial Performance in Romanian Public Hospitals.
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and leadership capacity in the hospital.24 Systematic attempts at 
characterising hospital governance in low and middle-income 
countries focussed on specific topics, such as autonomy.25 
Implications for Practice
The analysis informed a set of recommendations that were 
put forward to the Romanian MoH in 2017. These focused 
on setting a consensus-based policy process to review and 
reform the hospital sector configuration and governance 
arrangements. This process would entail improving hospital 
sector capacity planning, revisiting hospital classification 
and standards; revising hospital governance structures 
and oversight mechanisms; improving hospital financing 
and service purchasing arrangements. Recommendations 
on institutional improvement included reconsidering the 
business models and models of care within hospitals, based on 
the population’s health needs and realistic acknowledgment of 
financial limitations; investing in financial management and 
internal audit systems and processes; and putting emphases 
on continuous capacity building with a focus on advanced 
managerial competences. 
Conclusion
The assessment of governance arrangements in a sample 
of Romanian public hospitals proved a powerful tool 
for identifying system and hospital-specific challenges 
contributing to poor financial and overall performance, 
which have been documented. Similar assessments 
conducted elsewhere may constructively have impact in 
diagnosing hospital and health system performance, and 
formulating policy interventions for improved hospital 
service organisation and delivery.
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